Stages of the Demographic Transition from a Child's Perspective: Family Size, Cohort Size, and Children's Resources by Lam, David A. & Marteleto, Letícia
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 34(2 ) :  225–252  ( JUNE  2008)  225
Stages of the Demographic 
Transition from a Child’s 
Perspective: Family Size, 




THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION has played itself out with great regularity in de-
veloping countries over the last 50 years. Looking at a broad set of countries, a 
stylized version of the demographic transition is consistent with the empirical 
experience of most of the developing world. The transition begins with large 
and sustained declines in death rates, especially infant and child mortality. 
The immediate effect of this mortality decline is an increase in the number of 
surviving children at the family level and an increase in the total number of 
children at the population level. Mortality decline is eventually followed by 
the second key element of the transition, a decline in fertility, which in turn 
has effects on both family size and cohort size. These changes in family size and 
cohort size over the course of the demographic transition are the focus of this 
article. We develop a new characterization of stages of the transition, viewing 
the demographic changes from a child’s perspective. As we show, dramatic 
changes in the numbers of siblings and the size of cohorts can occur during the 
demographic transition, changes with important implications for children’s 
resources at the family level and the population level. These changes do not 
always move in the same direction, however, owing to the complex interac-
tion of population momentum with falling fertility and mortality.
We focus on three stages of the demographic transition from a child’s 
perspective, each with different implications for resource competition at the 
family and population level. In Stage 1 falling infant and child mortality leads 
to increasing numbers of surviving children within families and increases in 
the size of birth cohorts. This is the stage in which rapid population growth 
begins, as seen from both the family and population levels. In Stage 2 falling 
fertility overtakes falling mortality to produce declining family size, but cohort 
size continues rising as a result of population momentum. In Stage 3 falling 
226  D E M O G R A P H I C  T R A N S I T I O N  F R O M  A  C H I L D ’ S  P E R S P E C T I V E
fertility overtakes population momentum to cause declines in the absolute 
size of birth cohorts. Children, especially school-age children, compete for 
resources at both the family and the population level. Children born in Stage 
1 face increasing competition at both levels. Children born in Stage 2 face 
increasing competition at the population level, but have fewer siblings and 
thus face decreasing competition at the family level. Children born in Stage 3 
experience declines in both cohort size and family size, implying less competi-
tion for resources at both the population and family levels. 
After examining past research on cohort size, family size, and school-
ing, we develop a simple model of the dynamics of cohort size and family 
size during the demographic transition. Using this model as a framework, 
we analyze changes in fertility, mortality, surviving family size, and cohort 
size for eight countries with good census microdata. We first look at trends 
in fertility and infant survival for eight countries with census microdata for 
at least two years: Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Kenya, Mexico, South Africa, 
Uganda, and Vietnam. We show that in most countries the period in which 
surviving family size declined the fastest—usually the 1970s and 1980s—was 
also the period in which the childbearing population grew the fastest. Next 
we examine trends in cohort size using aggregate data for these countries 
plus all low- and middle-income countries with a population of at least 25 
million in 2005. We show that a large number of countries will experience 
a peak in the population aged 9–11 years between 2000 and 2010, although 
many African and South Asian countries will see continued cohort growth for 
several decades. We then turn to the family-size component of our analysis, 
using census microdata to look at changes in family size from the perspective 
of children aged 9–11. We first examine the case of Brazil, where we have 
data back to 1960. We show that surviving family size was declining in Brazil 
by the 1960s, while the largest birth cohort was not born until 1982. Looking 
at the other seven countries for which we have census microdata for multiple 
periods, we find that with the notable exception of Uganda, the number of 
siblings of children aged 9–11 declined between the two most recent censuses. 
This suggests that these countries have entered Stage 2, the stage in which 
children compete for resources with fewer siblings. Only Brazil had entered 
Stage 3, the stage at which this decline in the number of siblings coincided 
with a decline in the absolute number of children aged 9–11 between the 
most recent censuses, although all of the countries except Kenya and Uganda 
are likely to have entered that stage by 2010. 
Research on cohort size, family size, and 
children’s resources
Numerous researchers have considered the possible effects of family size and 
cohort size on resources available to children, with particular focus on their 
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impact on schooling.1 Although negative effects of rapid growth of the school-
age population on educational outcomes have frequently been mentioned as 
one of the potential negative consequences of rapid population growth (Jones 
1971; World Bank 1984), empirical evidence has been mixed. Using cross-
national data on age structure, school enrollments, and school expenditures, 
Schultz (1987) found no significant effect on school enrollment rates of the 
proportion of the population of school age, although he did find a negative re-
lationship between the proportion of the population of school age and public 
school expenditures per child. Kelley (2001) noted that several other studies 
based on cross-country data also suggest that there is no impact of relative 
cohort size on the share of national budgets allocated to schooling, although 
most of those studies did not look directly at schooling outcomes. In the case 
of Brazil, Birdsall and Sabot (1996) cited the rapid increase in the number 
of school-age children as a potential cause of the country’s poor educational 
performance in the 1980s. Lam and Marteleto (2005) showed that declines 
in the growth rate of the school-age population help explain Brazil’s large 
increases in school enrollment in the 1990s. 
An even larger literature looks at the impact of family size on schooling 
outcomes. As pointed out by Lloyd (1994) and Kelley (1996), this literature 
has produced mixed results. Most empirical studies in developing countries 
found that children from large families attained less schooling than children 
with fewer siblings (Anh et al. 1998; Knodel and Wongsith 1991; Lam and 
Marteleto 2005; Marteleto 2001; Parish and Willis 1993; Patrinos and Psacha-
ropoulos 1997; Psacharopoulos and Arriagada 1989). This fact is often attrib-
uted to resource dilution, with a smaller share of financial and interpersonal 
resources allocated to each child in larger families. Some studies, however, 
have found a positive association between family size and schooling (King 
1987; Mueller 1984), a result that Kelley (1996) argued could be theoretically 
plausible if there were large economies of scale in the production of human 
capital within families. Whatever the empirical relationship between family 
size and schooling, it is difficult to give a causal interpretation since choices 
about fertility and schooling are made jointly.
Our purpose is not to provide new evidence on the impact of cohort size 
or family size on children’s outcomes, but to analyze how cohort size and 
family size change during the demographic transition. Most of the discus-
sion of the dynamics of family size and cohort size during the demographic 
transition suggests that the two move together. As we show, both empirical 
evidence and simple models of the underlying population dynamics indicate 
that family size and cohort size may move in opposite directions for as long as 
several decades once fertility begins to fall. Understanding these dynamics can 
provide a clearer picture of how children’s competition for resources changes 
during the demographic transition, with critical implications for countries that 
have only recently begun to experience fertility decline.
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Dynamics of family size and cohort size
We present a stylized model that demonstrates several points about the 
dynamics of changes in family size and cohort size during the demographic 
transition. Assume for simplicity that a woman has all her births at the mean 
age of childbearing µ. This implies that all children born in a given year are 
born to women at age µ , and that the cohort total fertility rate (TFR) for these 
women is equal to the period TFR. We define s(t) as surviving family size for 
children born in year t, f(t) as the number of children born to every woman 
who gives birth in year t, and p(t) as the probability of a child born in year t 
surviving from birth to childbearing age.2 In the limiting case in which there is 
no variance in fertility across women, f is also the mean completed family size 
for children born in that year.3 Under the simplifying assumptions described 
above (including the assumption of no variance in fertility), surviving family 
size is simply the product of the fertility rate and the survival rate in a simple 
multiplicative relationship:
 s t f t p t( ) ( ) ( ).=  (1)
We take the natural logarithm of (1) and differentiate with respect to 

















Equation (2) simply states that the rate of change in surviving family size is 
the sum of the rate of change in fertility and the rate of change in survival. 
During most of the demographic transition, fertility declines while the survival 
probability increases, so the net change in surviving family size in any given 
period is ambiguous. While a more complete age profile of fertility would 
complicate equation (2), it would not change the basic point that declining 
fertility competes with increasing survival to determine changes in surviving 
family size during the transition. 
We continue with this simple model to introduce the dynamics of cohort 
size. The number of surviving births in year t, which we denote N
0
(t), depends 
on the number of childbearing-age women in year t and the number of surviv-
ing children born to each of those women. In our model the number of child-
bearing-age women is simply the number of women age µ in year t, N
µ
(t). We 
can therefore express the number of surviving children born in year t as: 
 N t N t s t N t f t p t0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).= =µ µ  (3)
Assuming that all surviving births reach the age of childbearing, we 
link current numbers of childbearing-age women to past births and modify 
equation (3): 
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 N t N t s t N t f t p t
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).= = −µ µ  (4)
Equation (4) makes the simple but fundamentally important point that cur-
rent numbers of surviving births are the product of cohort size one genera-
tion in the past multiplied by current fertility and survival rates. As above, 
it is useful to take logs and differentiate with respect to time to express the 

















0 µ  (5)
The role of population momentum is clearly evident in equation (5). 
The first term on the right-hand side is the growth rate of the childbear-
ing-age population in year t, or, equivalently (given our assumptions), the 
growth rate of numbers of surviving births µ years earlier. While the growth 
rate of the childbearing-age population is affected by fertility and mortality 
one generation back, it is not affected by current fertility and mortality, and 
hence need not move in the same direction as current family size. During 
the demographic transition the two terms on the right-hand side of equation 
(5) can clearly move in opposite directions. In particular, surviving family 
size will start to decline if fertility falls faster than infant mortality, but the 
childbearing-age population may continue to increase as a result of popula-
tion momentum.4 Equations (4) and (5) incorporate the same components of 
population growth as modeled by Bongaarts and Bulatao (1999), except that 
we ignore migration and only describe the size and rate of growth of single 
birth cohorts. Below we present decompositions of cohort growth similar to 
those of Bongaarts and Bulatao. 
Equation (5) provides a useful framework to describe the dynamics of 
family size and cohort size during the demographic transition. Assume that 
before the transition begins there is a stationary population with constant 
numbers of surviving births in every year, implying that ∂ ∂ =N t tµ( )/ 0  in 
equation (5). We can characterize the beginning of the demographic transi-
tion as an unexpected increase in the survival probability, ∂ ∂ >p t t( )/ 0 , in 
some year t
1
. Since this will not cause any change in the childbearing-age 
population for the first µ years, all effects on numbers of surviving children 
operate through increased survival probabilities. This increase in child survival 
must increase both the average size of families, s, and the number of surviv-
ing births in each year, N
0
, during the initial years of the transition. From 
the perspective of children, generations born in some initial set of years after 
year t
1
 experience both an increase in surviving numbers of siblings and an 
increase in cohort size relative to previous years. This is what we call Stage 1 
of the demographic transition from a child’s perspective. 
Following the standard pattern of the demographic transition, assume 
that with some lag a sustained fertility decline begins, ∂ ∂ <f t t( )/ 0 . Recall-
230  D E M O G R A P H I C  T R A N S I T I O N  F R O M  A  C H I L D ’ S  P E R S P E C T I V E
ing equation (2), surviving family size may continue to increase or begin to 
decline, depending on whether fertility falls fast enough to offset increasing 
child survival. It is entirely an empirical question whether and for how long 
surviving family size continues to increase after fertility begins to decline. We 
assume that at some point, possibly quite a few years after the onset of fertility 
decline, fertility begins to fall fast enough to offset increased child survival, 
leading to decreasing family size. 
Once surviving family size begins to fall, it need not (and generally will 
not) imply a decline in the number of surviving births in the population. As 
equation (5) shows, population momentum resulting from the growth in 
cohort size during the first stage of the transition will cause continued growth 
in the childbearing population for at least one generation. While it is not a 
mathematical necessity that cohort size continues growing after family size 
has begun to fall, the typical empirical pattern is continued growth in total 
numbers of births for two or three decades after family size begins to decline. 
This is what we call Stage 2 of the demographic transition from a child’s 
perspective. Children born in this period experience declining family size 
but increasing cohort size relative to previous cohorts. They compete with 
fewer siblings at home, but compete with more children of the same age in 
the overall population.5
Assuming that declines in fertility continue to be faster than increases 
in child survival, an eventual reduction in the impact of population momen-
tum is inevitable. Stage 1 of the transition from a child’s perspective is a race 
between falling fertility and falling mortality to determine when surviving 
family size begins to fall. Stage 1 ends when falling fertility overtakes fall-
ing mortality and family size declines. As equation (5) makes clear, Stage 
2 is similarly a race between falling fertility and population momentum to 
determine when the absolute number of births in the population begins to 
fall. Stage 2 ends when falling fertility overtakes population momentum to 
produce a decline in the absolute number of births. The decline in surviving 
family size must precede any decrease in cohort size. 
The stages as we have defined them may not be sharply defined. Family 
size may fall but then rise again if improvements in child survival once again 
overtake declines in fertility. Similarly, the absolute number of births may 
reach a peak, decline for a few years, then rise again as “waves” of population 
momentum work their way through the childbearing population. We may 
therefore observe a long flat peak or oscillations around a turning point in 
both family size and cohort size, rather than sharply defined peaks. Although 
the model outlined above makes a number of simplifying assumptions, it is 
a useful heuristic guide for understanding the short-run dynamics of family 
size and cohort size during the demographic transition. Using the model as 
a framework for looking at trends in fertility, infant survival, and the size 
of the childbearing population, we will see that the basic stages as we have 
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defined them are clearly evident for countries undergoing the demographic 
transition in recent decades.
Data
Fundamental to our analysis is an interest in both macro-level and micro-
level demographic changes during the demographic transition. Below we 
present data at both levels. Macro-level data on cohort size and age structure 
are more readily available than micro-level data on family size. Estimates of 
age distributions such as those made by the United Nations Population Divi-
sion (2005) provide a reasonably accurate picture of changes in cohort size 
back to 1950. We use these data to describe trends in the size of the popula-
tion aged 9–11, including projections for future decades. We use the 9–11 
age group at both the macro and micro levels for several reasons. We want 
to focus on a narrow age range of children who would be affected by both 
family size and cohort size. Age 10 represents an age at which most children 
should be in school. We use the 9–11 age group rather than age 10 alone in 
order to reduce problems that might result from age misreporting or small 
cell sizes. We prefer 9–11 over a broader group such as 7–14 in order to focus 
on a group that is closer to a single birth cohort, providing a better match to 
the model outlined above. 
To look at changes in family size, we need microdata from censuses or 
surveys at multiple points during the demographic transition. Since we focus 
on the number of siblings of children aged 9–11, we need large samples to 
generate large cell sizes for this age group. Our analysis draws on large public 
use census samples from eight countries. We pay special attention to Brazil, 
where we have excellent micro-samples of the census for 1960, 1970, 1980, 
1991, and 2000. We also use census samples from the Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series-International (IPUMS-I) project (Minnesota Population 
Center 2007) for Costa Rica (1973, 1984, and 2000), Ecuador (1974, 1982, 
1990, and 2001), Kenya (1989 and 1999), Mexico (1990 and 2000), South 
Africa (1996 and 2001), Uganda (1991 and 2002), and Vietnam (1989 and 
1999). While these censuses do not extend as far back in the demographic 
transition as the data for Brazil, they allow us to look at recent changes in 
family size from the perspective of school-age children. 
Our choice of countries is dependent on the availability of large cen-
sus samples and is admittedly not a representative sample of countries. 
Nevertheless, these countries reflect a considerable range of demographic 
experience. The four Latin American countries reflect the major features of 
the demographic transition in the region, with Brazil having had an earlier 
and faster fertility decline than Mexico, Costa Rica, and Ecuador. Vietnam 
has a unique history that makes it not entirely typical of Southeast Asia, but 
its fertility decline has been similar to the experience in much of the region. 
232  D E M O G R A P H I C  T R A N S I T I O N  F R O M  A  C H I L D ’ S  P E R S P E C T I V E
South Africa had an earlier and faster fertility decline than most of Africa, 
with a pattern similar to many Latin American countries. Kenya’s late fertility 
decline is similar to much of Africa, as is its continued rapid growth in the size 
of birth cohorts. Uganda is of interest as one of the few remaining countries 
with high fertility levels.6
Trends in fertility and infant survival
Figure 1 shows the total fertility rate and the probability of infant survival for 
all eight countries based on United Nations estimates (United Nations Popu-
lation Division 2005). The infant survival rate, which corresponds to p(t) in 
equation (1), is one minus the infant mortality rate (expressed as a propor-
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SOURCE: Estimates based on United Nations 2005.
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well known, several points are worth noting in the context of our framework. 
Fertility in all of these countries is high and relatively stable through the 1950s 
and 1960s. In most of the countries, this is followed by a period of rapid fertil-
ity decline and a subsequent leveling off. Kenya has a later and slower fertility 
decline, while Uganda shows no decline. The probability of infant survival 
shows more constant rates of change, in spite of having an upper asymptote 
of one. The growth rate of infant survival is around 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent 
per year in most of the countries between 1955 and 2000, taking the average 
rate of change between five-year periods. This compares to growth rates of 
fertility that begin around zero, fall to as fast as –4 percent to –5 percent per 
year during the period of most rapid fertility decline, then level off. Most of 
the change in surviving family size, then, is driven by falling fertility, with 
increasing child survival providing only a small offsetting effect. 
Figure 2 shows estimates of the rate of change in surviving family size. 
These are calculated by plugging the annual rate of change for fertility and 
survival into equation (2), which shows the predicted growth rate in surviv-
ing family size as the sum of the growth rate of fertility and the growth rate 
of survival.7 As seen in Figure 2, this prediction implies positive growth of 
surviving family size in the 1950s and 1960s for most countries, turning to 
a decline in family size in the 1970s and 1980s. These growth rates are very 
close to the growth rates of the TFR, since the growth rates of infant survival 
are much smaller in magnitude and thus have little impact on the growth 
rates of surviving family size. The general pattern is for family size to reach its 
maximum rate of decline in the 1980s or 1990s, falling at about 3 percent to 5 
percent per year. These growth rates rebound toward zero by the 1995–2005 
period, a result of the slowdown in fertility decline.
Trends in cohort size
As our model demonstrates, cohort size need not move in the same direction 
as family size during the demographic transition. The growth rate of cohort 
size depends on both the growth rate of surviving family size and the growth 
rate of the childbearing population. Figure 3 shows the annual growth rate 
of the childbearing population in our eight countries.8 The general pattern 
is that the growth rate hovers around 2 percent to 3 percent per year in the 
1950s and 1960s, increases to around 3 to 4 percent per year during the 
1970s and 1980s, then falls in the 1990s. All eight countries are projected 
to have positive growth rates of the childbearing-age population in 2010, 
although most are approaching zero at that point. Uganda’s childbearing 
population continues to grow rapidly, with a current growth rate of about 
4 percent per year. 
The growth rates of the childbearing population in Figure 3 interact with 
the growth rates of surviving family size in Figure 2 to produce the net growth 
rate in the size of surviving birth cohorts. Comparing the two figures, the 
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SOURCE: Calculations based on UN population estimates (United Nations 2005) using equation 2 above.
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maximum rate of increase of the childbearing population in most countries 
occurred around the 1980s, at roughly the same time as the maximum rate 
of decrease of surviving family size. This was the period in which the race 
between falling fertility and population momentum was at its most extreme, 
with the childbearing population growing at about 3 percent to 4 percent 
per year at the same time that surviving family size was falling at roughly 
similar rates. The combined effect of changes in the size of the childbearing 
population and changes in surviving family size is seen in Figure 4. Rather 
than looking at the size of cohorts at birth, Figure 4 shows the size of cohorts 
at ages 9–11, when most of the cohort should be enrolled in school. Figure 
4 presents UN estimates and projections of the number of 9–11-year-olds 
from 1950 to 2010, using 1950 = 1 as a benchmark. Brazil shows a peak in 
the 9–11 age group around 1995, corresponding to a peak in births ten years 
earlier. Many countries have a peak around 2000–2010. Kenya and Uganda 
are far off the scale of the other countries and are shown using a different 
scale. The projected number of 9–11-year-olds in 2010 is about eight times 
its 1950 level in Kenya and Uganda. 
Comparing these patterns to the predicted change in family size in Figure 
2, the implied peak in the number of births comes 10 to 30 years after the year 
in which we predict that surviving family size started to decline. The reason 
for the delay is population momentum driven by growth of the childbearing 
population. Also note in Figure 4 that the size of the population aged 9–11 
does not necessarily have a single peak. In Mexico and Brazil, for example, 
the number of births begins to decline but then increases for a period of time. 








































































































FIGURE 4   Index of the size of the population aged 9–11,























SOURCE: Estimates based on United Nations 2005.
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fertility competes with population momentum, the total number of births 
may well increase even after a period in which it was decreasing, and even 
though fertility continues to fall. The number of women of childbearing age 
grows at somewhat uneven rates owing to fluctuations in numbers of births 
in the past. Even if fertility falls at a steady rate, an increase in the rate of 
growth of the childbearing population could cause the number of births to 
increase again after an initial period of decline. 
Recalling equations (4) and (5), we can decompose the growth rate of 
the population aged 9–11 as the sum of the growth rate of the childbearing 
population, the growth rate of child survival, and the growth rate of fertility, 
all lagged ten years. A few examples are instructive. In Brazil the popula-
tion aged 9–11 grew at 0.8 percent per year from 1980 to 1985. Looking at 
Figures 2 and 3, we see that this resulted from a combination of 3.2 percent 
annual growth of the childbearing population and 2.4 percent annual decline 
in surviving family size in 1970–75.9 As previously noted, the growth rate 
of surviving family size is driven almost entirely by fertility decline, with 
increasing child survival having a very small offsetting effect. Kenya’s 9–11 
population grew 3.7 percent per year in 1990–95, the result of 4.4 percent an-
nual growth in the childbearing population and 0.7 percent annual decline in 
surviving family size in 1980–85. While these decompositions are instructive 
about the dynamics of cohort size and family size, they are based on imprecise 
UN estimates of fertility, mortality, and cohort size that are not necessarily 
perfectly consistent. Rather than presenting a full set of these decompositions, 
we focus below on more precise estimates of family-size dynamics based on 
direct analysis of micro-level census data.
Using the UN population projections, we can estimate the year in which 
every country in the world experiences a peak in population aged 9–11. Since 
it is impossible to have a decline in cohort size at the macro level without 
having a decline in family size at the micro level, the year of the peak in the 
9–11 population must be the year in which these countries enter our Stage 
3 from the perspective of 9–11-year-olds. Table 1 summarizes the results 
for low- and middle-income countries with populations of at least 25 mil-
lion in 2005.10 Column 2 shows the year in which the population aged 9–11 
reaches its peak within the 1950–2050 period of the UN projections. China 
and Thailand reached a peak around 1980, indicating that the largest birth 
cohort was born around 1970. Other large countries that had a peak in the 
9–11 population before 2000 were Indonesia, Brazil, Iran, and Algeria. Many 
countries have a peak between 2000 and 2009, including Vietnam, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, and South Africa. The current peak in youth populations in many 
developing countries was a major theme of the World Development Report 2007 
(World Bank 2006; Lam 2006). Looking at column 4, which shows the size 
of the 9–11 population at its peak (using 1950 = 1 as a baseline), many of the 
countries with a peak between 2000 and 2009 have a peak 9–11 population 
238  D E M O G R A P H I C  T R A N S I T I O N  F R O M  A  C H I L D ’ S  P E R S P E C T I V E
TABLE 1 Year of the peak in the population aged 9–11, total fertility 
rate, and infant survival probability for selected countries
   Population aged  Total fertility Infant survival 
Country and Year of  9–11 (1950=1)  rate  probability
period of peak peak 2005 At peak 1965 2005 1965 2005 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Before 2000
 China 1979 1.84 2.48 6.06 1.74 0.919 0.969
 Thailand 1982 2.06 2.44 6.00 1.87 0.926 0.983
 Indonesia 1993 2.10 2.22 5.57 2.20 0.856 0.966
 Brazil 1994 2.51 2.74 5.38 2.24 0.900 0.976
 Iran 1996 3.94 5.15 6.80 2.04 0.868 0.973
 Algeria 1996 3.22 3.70 7.38 2.39 0.852 0.969
2000–09
 Vietnam 2000 3.36 3.67 7.24 2.14 0.882 0.975
 Uzbekistan 2000 4.30 4.58 6.60 2.48 0.906 0.945
 Costa Rica 2001 3.98 4.12 5.80 2.10 0.932 0.990
 Mexico 2003 3.35 3.37 6.82 2.15 0.921 0.983
 Argentina 2003 2.15 2.15 3.05 2.25 0.943 0.987
 Myanmar 2003 2.82 2.86 6.00 2.08 0.868 0.934
 Colombia 2006 3.16 3.17 6.18 2.46 0.918 0.978
 Malaysia 2006 3.78 3.81 5.94 2.62 0.950 0.991
 South Africa 2006 3.30 3.30 5.80 2.64 0.916 0.961
 India 2007 2.84 2.85 5.69 2.76 0.855 0.940
 Philippines 2009 3.82 3.85 6.50 2.84 0.912 0.977
2010–35
 Ecuador 2010 3.61 3.68 6.50 2.58 0.893 0.979
 Morocco 2021 2.76 3.00 7.09 2.58 0.867 0.969
 Egypt 2022 3.12 3.78 6.56 2.99 0.830 0.970
 Venezuela 2022 4.46 4.78 5.91 2.55 0.940 0.984
 Peru 2026 3.27 3.28 6.56 2.66 0.874 0.971
 Pakistan 2029 4.73 5.66 6.60 3.73 0.862 0.929
 Bangladesh 2030 3.52 3.84 6.60 2.96 0.841 0.950
 Tanzania 2030 5.09 6.07 6.79 4.45 0.865 0.896
 Nepal 2034 3.53 4.06 5.92 3.30 0.827 0.945
After 2035
 Sudan 2041 3.87 4.77 6.67 3.95 0.856 0.935
 Iraq 2045 5.66 7.92 7.20 4.24 0.903 0.918
 Nigeria 2048 4.43 5.89 6.90 5.32 0.846 0.892
 Kenya 2049 6.60 11.88 8.12 4.96 0.896 0.937
 Dem. Rep. Congo 2050 5.06 13.23 6.30 6.70 0.862 0.888
 Afghanistan 2050 4.11 10.60 7.70 7.07 0.809 0.858
 Ethiopia 2050 4.60 7.02 6.82 5.42 0.852 0.909
 Uganda 2050 6.87 25.90 7.10 7.10 0.884 0.923
NOTE: Countries included are all countries classified as low to middle income by the World Bank with a popula-
tion of at least 25 million in 2005, plus Costa Rica and Ecuador. 
SOURCE: Estimates based on United Nations 2005.
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that is about three times larger than the 1950 level. Kenya and Uganda join 
a number of other African countries that are projected to have continued 
growth of the 9–11 population beyond 2040. While projections to that dis-
tance are imprecise, these countries will almost surely have continued growth 
of the 9–11 population for at least two more decades. 
Table 1 also shows UN estimates of the TFR and the infant survival 
probability for each country in 1965 and 2005. Not surprisingly, countries 
with earlier peaks in the 9–11 population tend to be those with larger fertility 
declines. Also, while all countries had significant increases in infant survival 
between 1965 and 2005, these increases only partially offset the decreases in 
fertility. In Indonesia, for example, the decline of 3.4 births in the TFR is re-
duced to a decline of 2.6 births if we adjust for infant survival, suggesting that 
children experienced a large decline in the number of surviving siblings over 
this period. Most of the countries in the first three panels of Table 1, and even 
some of those in the last panel, clearly had substantial declines in surviving 
family size between 1965 and 2005. This means that they entered Stage 2 at 
some point in the period, in many cases in the 1970s or 1980s. While column 
2 gives a fairly good estimate of the year in which these countries enter Stage 
3, it is much harder to identify the year in which countries enter Stage 2. In 
order to see when countries begin to experience a decline in surviving family 
size (the beginning of Stage 2), we need microdata at the household level, 
preferably covering a large part of the demographic transition. In the follow-
ing sections we use large census samples from the eight countries shown in 
Figures 1–4 to see how changes in family size compare to changes in cohort 
size during the demographic transition. We begin with Brazil, the country 
for which we have the most complete set of census microdata covering the 
demographic transition.
Cohort size and family size in Brazil
Brazil’s demographic transition is fairly typical of transitions across the de-
veloping world and is documented with excellent census data. As shown 
in Figure 1, the TFR began a rapid decline in the 1960s, falling to about 2.3 
births per woman by 2000. The fertility decline occurred during a period of 
rapid social change that included both economic growth and economic crisis 
(Martine 1996; Lam and Duryea 1999). There was large regional variation, 
with fertility decline starting later in the poorer north and northeast regions 
than in the higher-income south and southeast. Brazil’s rapid population 
growth in the 1960s and 1970s, evident in the size of birth cohorts, was also 
fairly typical. As shown in Figure 4, the number of 9–11-year-olds more than 
doubled between 1950 and 1975, reflecting the size of birth cohorts ten years 
earlier. Using overlapping age distributions from the 1960–2000 censuses, 
Lam and Marteleto (2005) showed that the largest cohort was born in 1982. 
As seen in Figure 4, the growth rate of birth cohorts varies over time, with 
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much slower growth in the 1960s than the 1970s. These fluctuations in cohort 
size result from the interaction between falling fertility and the growth of the 
childbearing population. The decline in cohort size after the peak in the early 
1980s is also uneven, with cohort size increasing again in the 1990s, produc-
ing the growth of the 9–11 age group around 2005 seen in Figure 4. 
The changes in fertility and mortality that caused the changes in cohort 
size also caused large changes in family size. Table 2 shows estimates of the 
TABLE 2 Number of siblings of children aged 9–11 ever 
born and surviving and change per year, Brazil 1960–2000
  Siblings ever born Siblings surviving
Sample and   Change  Change 
year Mean per year Mean per year 
 (1)  (2)   (3)  (4)   (5)
All Brazil
 1960 6.43  4.96
 1970 6.13 –0.03 5.03 0.01
 1980 5.25 –0.09 4.50 –0.05
 1991 4.12 –0.10 3.61 –0.08
 2000 3.16 –0.11 2.88 –0.08
Northeast
 1960 7.62  5.41
 1970 7.28 –0.03 5.59 0.02
 1980 6.55 –0.07 5.26 –0.03
 1991 5.56 –0.09 4.65 –0.06
 2000 4.28 –0.14 3.73 –0.10
Southeast
 1960 5.73  4.58
 1970 5.43 –0.03 4.57 0.00
 1980 4.47 –0.10 3.97 –0.06
 1991 3.19 –0.12 2.90 –0.10
 2000 2.44 –0.08 2.30 –0.07
Mother’s schooling <4 years
 1960 6.83  5.19
 1970 6.63 –0.02 5.37 0.02
 1980 6.01 –0.06 5.05 –0.03
 1991 5.54 –0.04 4.74 –0.03
 2000 4.76 –0.09 4.22 –0.06
Mother’s schooling ≥4 years
 1960 4.67  3.94
 1970 4.42 –0.02 3.89 –0.01
 1980 3.74 –0.07 3.39 –0.05
 1991 2.71 –0.09 2.50 –0.08
 2000 2.19 –0.06 2.07 –0.05
SOURCE: Estimates from Brazilian census microsamples.
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mean number of siblings of children aged 9–11 based on Brazilian censuses 
from 1960 to 2000. Column 2 shows the mean number of siblings ever born, 
and column 4 shows the mean number of siblings surviving at the time of 
the census. These figures are based on the number of children ever born and 
children still alive reported by their mothers in the census.11 Columns 3 and 
5 show the absolute change per year (simplifying comparisons when the in-
tercensal interval is not ten years). The mean number of siblings ever born in 
column 2 indicates that Brazil’s fertility decline was already underway before 
1970.12 The mothers of 9–11-year-olds reported 0.3 fewer children ever born 
in 1970 than did their counterparts in 1960. The mean number of surviving 
siblings (column 4) shows a different pattern, however, with an increase of 
0.07 between 1960 and 1970. This is an increase of 0.007 per year, which is 
rounded in column 5 to 0.01 siblings per year. While this increase in surviving 
siblings is very small, it suggests that Brazil was still in Stage 1 of the demo-
graphic transition in 1970: increasing infant and child survival was leading to 
increasing family size, even though fertility had already begun to decline. 
The decline in children ever born between 1970 and 1980 is substan-
tially larger than the 1960–70 decline. Children aged 9–11 in 1980 had almost 
one less sibling ever born than their 1970 counterparts. This decline was large 
enough to cause a 0.5 decline in the number of surviving siblings. The fact 
that the number of siblings ever born declined by 0.88 while the number 
of surviving children declined by only 0.53 indicates that increasing child 
survival continued to play an important role. The number of siblings ever 
born continued to fall rapidly in the next two decades, with a decline of 1.13 
from 1980 to 1991 and 0.96 from 1991 to 2000. The net impact of declining 
fertility over these four decades was that 9–11-year-olds in 2000 had more 
than two fewer surviving siblings than their counterparts in 1960, a decline 
of over 40 percent. 
The next two panels of Table 2 present separate estimates for two large 
regions of Brazil, the less developed northeast and the higher-income south-
east. Fertility decline began later in the northeast, making it informative to 
compare the evolution of family size in the two regions. Fertility decline was 
already evident in the northeast in 1960–70, with a decline of 0.34 between 
1960 and 1970 in the mean number of siblings ever born to children aged 
9–11. As was the case for all Brazil, increased infant and child survival more 
than offset this decline, however, leading to a 0.18 increase in surviving fam-
ily size in the northeast between 1960 and 1970. The southeast, on the other 
hand, had already moved out of Stage 1 by 1970, with a slight decrease in the 
mean number of surviving siblings between 1960 and 1970. In the 1970–80 
period we see a decline in surviving family size in the northeast, indicating 
that the northeast moved into Stage 2 of the transition sometime between 
1970 and 1980. Children aged 9–11 in the northeast had 0.33 fewer surviving 
siblings in 1980 than they did in 1970. 
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Table 2 also compares trends in family size for mothers with high and 
low education. Low education is defined as less than four years of schooling 
(roughly the median level of schooling for women aged 30 in 1980). Lam 
and Duryea (1999) showed a strong negative relationship between women’s 
schooling and fertility in Brazil, with increases in women’s schooling playing 
a major role in the fertility decline. Here we use mother’s schooling as a proxy 
for socioeconomic status (SES) that reflects a number of variables in addition 
to mother’s schooling, including husband’s schooling and family income. As 
with the regional breakdown, we observe an increase between 1960 and 1970 
in the number of surviving siblings for the low-SES children, but a decrease 
for high-SES children. After 1970 family size fell for both groups, but fell at a 
much faster rate for the high-SES children. The number of surviving siblings 
fell by 0.98, or 19 percent, between 1960 and 2000 for the low-SES children, 
while it fell by 1.87, or 47 percent, for high-SES children. 
Figure 5 shows the frequency distribution of numbers of siblings of 
children aged 9–11 in each Brazilian census, providing a clear picture of the 
evolution of small families in Brazil. The peak of the density moved from four 
siblings in 1960 to one sibling in 2000. The percentage with three siblings 
stays roughly constant across the five censuses, with the percentage above 
three falling rapidly over time. Over 25 percent of 9–11-year-olds had only 
one sibling in 2000, compared to 7 percent in 1960. Looking across the five 
censuses, some of the largest changes in family size of 9–11-year-olds take 
place between the 1980 and 1991 censuses. These changes reflect the rapid 
declines in fertility in Brazil between 1970 and 1981, declines that far offset 






























































Number of surviving siblings
FIGURE 5   Frequency distribution of the number of siblings of
children aged 9–11, Brazilian censuses, 1960–2000: Proportion with






SOURCE: Estimates from Brazilian census microsamples.
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Figure 6 combines the estimates of cohort size and family size for children 
aged 9–11 in the five censuses from 1960 to 2000, providing a concise summary 
of the stages of the demographic transition from a child’s perspective. As noted 
above, the number of surviving siblings rises slightly between the 1960 and 
1970 censuses. The total number of 9–11-year-olds in the population increases 
by about 30 percent between 1960 and 1970. From the perspective of 9–11-
year-olds, Brazil was still in Stage 1 of the demographic transition between 
1960 and 1970, with both family size and cohort size increasing. Between 1970 
and 1980 the number of surviving siblings declined, while the total number of 
9–11-year-olds in the population continued to grow, increasing by 19 percent 
during the decade. Although we cannot specify the turning point, which could 
have occurred either during the 1960s or 1970s, Brazil was clearly well into 
Stage 2 by 1980, with falling numbers of siblings and rising cohort size. These 
trends continued between the 1980 and 1991 censuses. Children aged 9–11 in 
1991 had one less sibling than their counterparts in 1980, but the total number 
of 9–11-year-olds in the population increased by 30 percent, almost as large as 
the increase of the 1960s. With the largest cohort born in 1982, the number 
of 9–11-year-olds declined between the 1991 and 2000 census by about 10 
percent. The timing of the entry into Stage 3 of the demographic transition 
is much easier to see than the boundary between Stage 1 and Stage 2, since 
it only requires identification of the year in which the largest cohort is born. 
From the perspective of a 9–11-year-old, 1992 marks the year in which there 
is both a decline in the absolute number of 9–11-year-olds  in the population 




















































FIGURE 6   Number of surviving siblings of 9–11-year-olds and total















SOURCE: Number of siblings estimated from Brazilian census microsamples; number of 9–11-year-
olds based on United Nations 2005.
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Changing family size in other countries
We can perform the same kind of analysis on other countries for which we 
have multiple censuses. We use the large census samples for Costa Rica, Ec-
uador, Kenya, Mexico, South Africa, Uganda, and Vietnam provided through 
the IPUMS-International project, each of which has at least two censuses. 
Table 3 shows the mean number of siblings ever born and mean number of 
siblings surviving for children aged 9–11, based on mothers’ reports of chil-
dren ever born and of children surviving. The table also shows the absolute 
number of 9–11-year-olds relative to 1950 and the annual growth rate of 
9–11-year-olds for each intercensal period, based on UN estimates. 
TABLE 3 Number of siblings ever born and number of surviving 
siblings of children aged 9–11, and size of the population aged 9–11, 
seven countries
  
Siblings ever born Siblings surviving
 Cohort size
       Annual  
Country  Change  Change Level growth 
and year Mean per year Mean per year (1950=1) rate (%) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Costa Rica
 1973 6.73  5.84  2.66
 1984 4.34 –0.22 3.96 –0.17 2.75 0.28
 2000 2.95 –0.09 2.84 –0.07 4.11 2.52
Ecuador
 1974 6.36  5.21  2.27
 1982 5.53 –0.10 4.69 –0.06 2.80 2.65
 1990 4.56 –0.12 4.00 –0.09 3.30 2.05
 2001 3.59 –0.09 3.31 –0.06 3.56 0.68
Kenya
 1989 6.02  5.23  5.06
 1999 5.21 –0.08 4.57 –0.07 6.47 2.46
Mexico
 1990 4.57  4.12  3.22
 2000 3.99 –0.06 3.63 –0.05 3.34 0.37
South Africa
 1996 3.60  3.10  3.16
 2001 2.99 –0.12 2.79 –0.06 3.22 0.38
Uganda
 1991 6.16  4.78  4.24
 2002 5.63 –0.05 4.78 0.00 6.24 3.50
Vietnam
 1989 3.86  3.59  3.08
 1999 2.62 –0.12 2.48 –0.11 3.62 1.62
SOURCE: Number of siblings estimated from IPUMS-International census microsamples (Minnesota Population 
Center 2007); cohort size based on United Nations 2005.
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Table 3 indicates that the change in siblings ever born is negative for ev-
ery period in every country. This is not surprising, since at least modest fertility 
decline had begun to reduce children ever born for all of these countries in the 
periods considered. The largest annual decline was 0.22 siblings per year in 
Costa Rica from 1973 to 1984. The unweighted mean for all countries and pe-
riods is a decline of 0.1 per year, or 1 sibling per decade. The change in surviv-
ing siblings is also negative for every country except Uganda, where the mean 
number of surviving siblings is identical in the 1991 and 2002 censuses. This 
suggests that increasing child survival exactly offset the small fertility decline 
in Uganda in this period. The unweighted mean for all periods and countries 
is a decline of 0.06 per year, or 0.6 surviving siblings per decade. Unlike Brazil, 
where we saw an increase in the number of surviving siblings in 1960–70, the 
data for other countries do not go back far enough to see Stage 1, when chil-
dren experienced both increasing family size and increasing cohort size. For 
the periods we observe, all countries had entered Stage 2 with the exception 
of Uganda, which was on the border between Stage 1 and Stage 2. 
Looking at the evidence on cohort size in columns 6 and 7 of Table 3, 
all of the countries experienced an increase in the absolute number of 9–11-
year-olds in the periods shown. This suggests that none of these countries 
had entered Stage 3 by the most recent census reported in Table 3. Several 
had reached a point at which the number of 9–11-year-olds was approaching 
its peak, however. As shown in Table 1, Vietnam, Costa Rica, Mexico, South 
Africa, and Ecuador are all projected to have entered Stage 3 by 2010. Kenya 
and Uganda, in which the number of 9–11-year-olds grew at annual rates 
of 2.5 percent and 3.5 percent in the last intercensal period, are projected to 
have continued growth of the population aged 9–11 until after 2040. 
While we would like to construct the equivalent of Figure 6 for all coun-
tries, the data for countries other than Brazil do not allow us to go back far 
enough into the early stages of the demographic transition. There is every rea-
son to think that other countries would demonstrate patterns similar to Brazil, 
with 25 or 30 years spent in Stage 2. Costa Rica, for example, had declining 
numbers of siblings for 9–11-year-olds between 1973 and 1984, but did not 
reach a peak in the population aged 9–11 until 2001. Many of the countries 
for which we only observe sibling size after 1980 almost surely had declines 
in the number of surviving siblings for at least one decade earlier than that. If 
we could observe the year in which surviving family size began to decline in 
these countries, we expect that there would be at least 20 or 30 years between 
that year and the year in which cohort size begins to decline.
Figure 7 shows the cumulative distribution of numbers of siblings of 
children aged 9–11 in all eight countries. The distributions clearly demonstrate 
the decline in family size over time in each country and the large differences 
between countries. One powerful summary measure of the decline in family 
size is the change in the proportion of children with two or fewer siblings. 



































































FIGURE 7   Cumulative distribution of siblings of children aged 9–11, eight 
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SOURCE: Estimates from IPUMS-International census microsamples (Minnesota Population Center 2007).
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Looking at the three countries where our data cover long time spans, the 
proportion of 9–11-year-olds with two or fewer surviving siblings rose from 
20 percent to 58 percent between 1960 and 2000 in Brazil, from 13 percent 
to 45 percent between 1974 and 2001 in Ecuador, and from 13 percent to 
54 percent between 1973 and 2000 in Costa Rica. In Vietnam the proportion 
with two or fewer siblings rose from 34 percent to almost 60 percent from 
1989 to 1999, a dramatic emergence of small families in just one decade. 
Kenya and Uganda stand out with cumulative distributions that contin-
ue to be dominated by high fractions of children with many surviving siblings. 
The proportion with two or fewer surviving siblings was only 20 percent in 
Kenya in 1999 and 16 percent in Uganda in 2002, levels last seen two or three 
decades earlier in Latin America. Family size nonetheless changed substan-
tially in Kenya between 1989 and 1999. The percentage with three or fewer 
siblings increased from 25 percent to 37 percent, while the percentage with 
more than five siblings fell from 41 percent to 32 percent. The distributions 
for Uganda in 1991 and 2002 are virtually indistinguishable from each other. 
Not only was there no change in mean surviving family size in Uganda, as 
documented above, but there appears to have been no significant change at 
any point in the distribution. 
The distributions in Figure 7 document the remarkable declines in family 
size experienced by the typical school-age child during the demographic tran-
sition. The decline in the prevalence of large families is particularly striking. 
In Costa Rica, the percentage of 9–11-year-olds with more than five siblings 
fell from 50 percent to 10 percent between 1973 and 2000, roughly within 
one generation. We also see the large diversity in family size observed in the 
2000 round of censuses. The percentage of 9–11-year-olds with more than 
four siblings in the census closest to 2000 ranged from 51 percent in Uganda 
to 25 percent in Ecuador and 12 percent in Vietnam. 
Summary and conclusions
While the basic empirical regularities of falling mortality, falling fertility, and 
resulting patterns in population growth rates are well known, little attention 
has been paid to the implications of these changes for the dynamics of family 
size and cohort size. These dynamics have a number of intriguing features, 
the most important of which is the tendency for family size and cohort size 
to move in opposite directions during a significant part of the demographic 
transition.
We have proposed a characterization of the demographic transition 
from a child’s perspective that has three stages. Children born in Stage 1 face 
increases in both family size and cohort size, the result of increased child 
survival. Children born in Stage 2 experience declining family size, as falling 
fertility overtakes falling mortality, but face continued increases in cohort 
size as the result of population momentum. Children born in Stage 3 experi-
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ence declines in both cohort size and family size and face less competition 
for resources at both the population and family levels. Using a simple model 
of the demographic transition, we demonstrate the key components of these 
stages: a race between falling fertility and falling mortality in Stage 1, a race 
between falling fertility and population momentum in Stage 2, and concur-
rent declines in cohort size and family size in Stage 3. This model suggests 
that Stage 2 will be a typical feature of the demographic transition, usually 
lasting two or three decades. 
Seven of the eight countries we examined— Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Kenya, South Africa, and Vietnam—moved into Stage 2 long enough 
ago that we see a clear decline in the number of surviving siblings for chil-
dren aged 9–11 between the two most recent censuses. In Brazil, where we 
have census data back to 1960, we see a movement from Stage 1 to Stage 2 
sometime in the 1960s or 1970s. For the other countries it is impossible to 
tell when they moved from Stage 1 to Stage 2 in the absence of comparable 
microdata for earlier years. However, in all cases we know there had to be a 
Stage 1, since there had to be a period in which family size increased in order 
to create the rapid population growth and resulting population momentum 
seen in all seven countries. We also know that these seven countries had 
moved from Stage 1 to Stage 2 by at least the 1990s, and probably well before 
then. Uganda is the exception to the rule, with the 1991 and 2002 censuses 
showing identical numbers of surviving siblings for children aged 9–11. 
While seven of the eight countries had entered the stage in which we 
observe declines in the number of surviving siblings for school-age children 
by the 2000 census round, only Brazil had entered Stage 3, the stage in which 
this decline is matched by a decline in the absolute number of school-age chil-
dren. UN estimates suggest that Costa Rica, Mexico, South Africa, Vietnam, 
and Ecuador will have entered this stage by 2010, while Kenya and Uganda 
will continue to have rapid growth of the 9–11 age group until after 2035. 
Declines in the absolute numbers of 9–11-year-olds have come later 
than the decline in the number of surviving siblings of 9–11-year-olds in all 
the countries we considered. This is the pattern we would expect from our 
model of the demographic transition. Declines in surviving family size are a 
necessary condition for declines in cohort size. While it is not a mathematical 
necessity that cohort size will continue to grow for some period after family 
size declines, we believe the basic patterns shown for these eight countries 
will be typical of most other countries during their demographic transition. 
Specifically, there will be a period of two or three decades in which school-age 
children experience declining numbers of siblings but increasing numbers of 
same-age children in the population. Most countries in East Asia and Latin 
America experienced this stage during the 1970s, 1980s, and into the 1990s. 
As shown by Lam and Marteleto (2005), it was not until declining family 
size was accompanied by declining cohort size in the 1990s that Brazil began 
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to experience significant rates of improvement in educational attainment. 
As shown in Table 1, many countries are experiencing their peak number 
of 9–11-year-olds during 2000–09. While these children compete with the 
largest cohort sizes ever born in their countries, they have significantly fewer 
siblings than did their parents. 
The implications of these changes in family size and cohort size depend 
on the interaction between these two variables and such outcomes as school-
ing, health, and eventually labor market experience. How children fare on 
a given outcome during each stage of the transition depends on the impact 
of family size versus cohort size for that outcome. Child health and nutri-
tion may be more affected by competition with siblings than by competition 
with other members of the cohort, although provision of clinics and other 
services may be affected by cohort size. Schooling may be more affected by 
rapid growth of cohorts than by competition with siblings. During the two 
or three decades of the demographic transition that most countries spend in 
Stage 2, children benefit from reduced competition for resources inside the 
family, but face increased competition at the population level. In terms of 
schooling, the cohort growth during this stage may imply larger class sizes, 
crowded schools, and lower funding per pupil. It is critical to take these dy-
namics into account in order to understand the trends in education in the 
many countries that have just moved from Stage 2 to Stage 3. These dynamics 
are even more important for understanding the educational challenges faced 
by many African and South Asian countries that will have continued cohort 
growth for several more decades.
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1 A valuable review of this literature is 
provided in the National Academy of Sciences’ 
report, Growing Up Global (Lloyd 2005). See 
also Jones (1971), Lloyd (1994), and Kelley 
(1996, 2001). 
2 For simplicity we use p(t) to indicate 
survival to childbearing age. Infant mortality 
is by far the major component of this sur-
vival, especially during the early part of the 
demographic transition, so changes in infant 
survival will be a reasonably good proxy for 
changes in p(t). 
3 As pointed out by Preston (1976), if 
there is variance in fertility across women, 
then the mean family size of children will be 
larger than the mean family size of women. 
We abstract from this discrepancy in this 
analysis, but analyze the issue in detail in Lam 
and Marteleto (2008). 
4 We use the term “population momen-
tum” in a broader sense than it is usually 
used. The term generally refers to the fact 
that a population continues to grow for some 
time after replacement fertility has been 
reached. We use it to refer to the fact that 
the number of surviving births continues to 
increase after surviving family size declines, 
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the result of increasing numbers of women 
of childbearing age. As we will see, cohort 
size begins to decline in the countries we 
analyze before replacement fertility has been 
reached, the result of the short-run dynamics 
from the competition between falling fertility 
and increasing numbers of childbearing-age 
women. We use the term population mo-
mentum to describe the component of the 
dynamics that is driven by increasing size of 
the childbearing population resulting from 
higher fertility rates in the past. 
5 Ryder (1975) pointed out that depen-
dency ratios in the population need not move 
in the same direction as dependency ratios 
within families for reasons similar to the 
points we make here. 
6 Although Uganda’s high fertility has 
persisted throughout the last decades, some 
predict that the prospects for a future fertility 
decline are high because of high HIV/AIDS 
prevalence and because of evidence of fertility 
decline among urban, better-educated women 
(Blacker et al. 2005).
7 The growth rates of family size in Figure 
2 are for the ten-year period surrounding each 
point. For example, the point for 1955 is based 
on the rates of growth of fertility and child 
survival between the 1950–55 period and the 
1955–60 period.
8 The size of the childbearing popula-
tion is calculated by weighting the number of 
women in each age group by the contribution 
each age group makes to overall fertility, using 
an average age-specific fertility schedule for 
Brazil around 1980. We use this weighting 
scheme rather than simply taking the num-
ber of women aged 15–44, in order to more 
accurately reflect the impact of changing age 
structure on the actual childbearing popula-
tion. In practice the growth rates in Figure 
3 are almost identical if we use the number 
of women aged 15–44 or some alternative 
weighted aggregation of those age groups. 
9 This decomposition is similar in ap-
proach to Bongaarts and Bulatao’s (1999) 
decompositions of future population growth 
into components related to fertility, mortal-
ity, and population momentum. While they 
decompose the change in total population be-
tween 2000 and 2010, our model decomposes 
the growth rate of surviving births over short 
intervals. It is important to do the analysis 
over short intervals since the growth rates 
of the components change sign during the 
demographic transition.
10 Although Costa Rica and Ecuador 
have populations below 25 million in 2005, 
we include them in Table 1 since they are two 
of the eight countries we analyze in detail 
throughout the article.
11 As is usual in census data, children 
are linked to their mothers using the relation-
ship of children to the household head. With 
the exception of female-headed households, 
this requires assumptions about whether the 
head’s wife is the mother of the head’s chil-
dren. We have excluded cases in which the 
wife is not plausibly the child’s mother, but 
inevitably there are likely to be some errors 
in matching. 
12 As mentioned in endnote 3, the mean 
family size of children does not necessarily 
track the mean family size of women. The 
differences in family size of children and fam-
ily size of women during the demographic 
transition are analyzed empirically in Lam and 
Marteleto (2008). Here we focus only on fam-
ily size from the perspective of children. 
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